<I. Texts from the context of the publication plan of autumn 1926>

No. 1

Theme and epoché

<The> sense of transcendental reduction. <The problem of> the return into the natural attitude (October 1926)

<§ 1.> Purely psychological attitude and transcendentally phenomenological attitude. The questions of the change of attitude

I can gain and study my and our pure consciousness life with a view to “purely phenomenological” psychology, without having a properly transcendental attitude. Progressive uncovering of the pure consciousness, whereby epoché *eo ipso* needs to be performed with regard to the actuality of the world conscious within it. Thus my purpose simply demands it. The epoché is the necessary means to work out human psychic life in its pure internality. What is the difference thus to the transcendental attitude? Of course the world remains accepted by me as a psychologist – I am and remain habitually directed towards it -, just that I am exclusively interested in pure psychic life temporarilly – in abstraction from real bodiliness, being my own as well. The reality is constantly that, which is meant and posited, and thereby the abstractively explored consciousness as a real one [is] concrete only in real unity with the corresponding bodiliness. The all of realities in contrast to that, the world, is a mere phenomenon in the transcendental attitude; the epoché delivering this phenomenon is performed in a universal and absolute way, and this remains.

[4] On the other hand, I can practice transcendental reflection *in infinitum*, and *in infinitum* I find myself then as a subject of pure life of a different level, but always of a transcendental one. Wondrous enough: Every transcendental and the attitude itself are completely reflected in the psychological, and every psychological [is reflected] in the transcendental. Sentence after sentence returns on one and the other side, a “small” phrase, and the whole transcendental eidetic phenomenology becomes the descriptive apriori psychology of the consciousness, a rational immanent psychology in the true sense, returning here despite all anathemata not only as a postulate, but as the most strict science.[[1]](#footnote-1) An empirical research of the consciousness, being a pure empirical research of the consciousness, returns in double edition, certainly one, which you have never seen in the inability of universal consideration of the consciousness (except for a great premonition by P. Natorp[[2]](#footnote-2)). The universe of positive empirical sciences results in a transcendental empirical research in transcendental interpretation (which is a strictly scientific uncovering), but which may again be turned into a psychologically empirical research.

But this is not a game we are playing, and it concerns the seriousness of the final clarities and of all final decisions as such. And if this double truth actually is some double truth, as undoubtedly [it is], then it needs to be understood. First of all – and this is our task now -, it needs to actually be ascertained in its doubleness. The transcendental attitude implies: It is possible to actually practice universal epoché and consciousness and to posit nothing else but consciousness, without having anything in advance, or rather, in such a way that every having-in-advance, <every> pregivenness is cut off.

Natural attitude and psychological attitude. The world is pregiven in natural life 1) in an unreflected way: the present nature, considered in self-forgetfulness; 2) in reflection [5] acts: Men and animals <are> given, works of art, etc. something mental.

<§ 2.> Psychology as science of man’s psychic life

I. The psychic life is in such a way thematic that the bodiliness and other parts of the world, to which the psychic thing has a real relation, also belong to the special theme. Thus with regard to all psychophysical problems in the common sense, examinations, theories. All psychology indeed implies bodiliness and the world as such in its theme. Yet there is an essential difference. If I study the seeing as seeing in the common sense, which makes up the concept of natural everyday life and also necessarily enters psychology, thus it is a many-sided complex of processes: a psychic seeing, which is a “fact of consciousness”, and a bodily seeing of the eye, of the nervous system, etc., which is a natural process.

But not only that, when considered exactly. My consciousness of having eyes also belongs to my processs of consciousness “seeing”, to “have the eyes directed” towards the object, to overview the object’s surface with the eyes, moving them, but also to bend forward, etc. [[3]](#footnote-3) And the object as well plays a double role: One time it is an object, which is seen, the other time it is a thing of actuality everyone (and this may also be the psychologizing subject) experiences and ascertains and may ascertain as actuality through tests of the experience. Possibly he ascertains, the seeing subject has a seen object, which is not in truth, it is a hallucinated object. All this of course also belongs to the theme as well in many psychological studies.

[6] Here is a special theme thus, which includes the physical body and the objects of the world as being ones in its theme. The psychologist posits processes of consciousness, posits objects, being conscious in them, as actualities as well (or he takes a stand otherwise deviating from them), furthermore <he> posits the body as well and special occurrences of the body (or he seeks to explore them).

The natural man experiences himself and other ones as men mentally living something psychic (consciousness) as souls, as subjects of the consciousness, and direct themselves towards certain present things of the world in this mental living, possibly direct themselves towards certain objective points in the space, and “project” hallucinated objects into it, thereby active in such and such a way, participate. [[4]](#footnote-4) The psychologist, by considering men, stands on the same ground of precondition convictions as the natural man, and he asks: If men perceive a thing “in a normal way”, <directed> towards a thing, which is actual and at this or that point in space (which one may “objectively convince” oneself of), what happens then in his bodiliness and in the spatial world, and on the other hand, which parts, sides, characteristics of the object is he actually able to see with his bodiliness and his position in the objective space, with the nature of the objects and his physical organs, and in which way is he supposed to see them; on the other hand, if he hallucinates, what may then be ascertained psychophysically, etc.? Whether the psychologist performs pure “self-observation” thereby, pure self-perception, or foreign perception (pure analysis of the consciousness), something psychic in relation to bodiliness and some intentionally objective of the respective consciousness, which at the same time is also posited as actuality, belong to his special theme in this attitude, to the sense-content of the experienced and furthermore predicable.

The direction of the consciousness towards world objects (provable objective actualities) is something well known and given: towards objects being in themselves, this means, which everyone may find and prove as actualities. Pure consciousness in its own essential context does not arrive at detachment at all, and one may indeed [7] exhibit general facts in an empiric way, which are not in need of it. Only at best that the respective man, for example the test person, is seeing “the” thing from this and that side (which is a subjective talk), is seeing it in this and that orientation, close, distant, right, left, touches it from above or from the side, suchlike comes into question. Noematic reflections thereby play their part, one does not need to know though (I do not at all wish to claim by that, if [one does not need to know it] for some final exact psychophysics) of pure consciousness, of the systematic of noeses and noemes, etc. How far such a theme, to be called a psychophysical one in the widest sense, reaches, and in which methods it may gain relative exactness, is a special question, which of course may only be asked in a completely fruitful way and answered, if some phenomenology already exists.

II. The tendency towards some “pure” psychology, having its starting point in Descartes and, spoken in a good sense, from Locke’s school as well, a psychology of pure facts of the consciousness on the basis of pure experience of the consciousness, has not arrived at any fruitful effect historically; only phenomenology has given the option for this kind of psychology, and (although it wanted to be transcendental philosophy itself) yet first existence. The theme of all questions and sentences is here consciousness in its pure own essentialness, and therefore nothing of “the” world, of this or that (being) body, thing, etc., does occur in any special nor in any general themes of some pure psychology[[5]](#footnote-5) (at least as eidetic psychology it is not only possible, but in the actual becoming and insofar there), and of any other being thing, objective thing, unless of the consciousness, which simply is the exclusive theme – and may be it. To this corresponds in the eidetic doctrine of consciousness: Nothing of the possible world is found in it. This does not exclude though that empirical psychology is in question in the empirical attitude, eidetic psychology in eidetic [attitude], that the consciousness in its purity still is the consciousness of some animal living beings, that its laws are laws for such living beings, and as that remain constantly meant, [8] and that even if rational psychology is performed a possible world is on the one hand considered along, and only its determination is left open (determinable by a universal real ontology[[6]](#footnote-6), in which rational psychology belonged as well), on the other hand the de facto world as a matter of course is left as existent, and this eidetic science, as for example positive mathematics, is only seen as a tool for the cognition of actuality, which was world cognition. It is indeed a matter of fact from a natural point of view to take the world you have as a starting point, and go over to eidetic options of the world, that is, to view all apriori disciplines as disciplines of the apriori cosmology (in the complete and proper, not historical sense of the word) and related to the de facto cosmos.

The apriori science of consciousness then was equally related to an apriori anthropology and zoology in the frame of an apriori world science as an empirically pure doctrine of consciousness to an empirical anthropology in the frame of a system of empirical world sciences; because we also find possible “monads” as such in the apriori as souls in the possible psychophysical context, and we find on the other hand the respective universal psychophysical context and the respective possible world belonging to this universal context in each of this possible monads – as intentionally constituted.

We need to regard as well though that we, living as children of the world, and thus finding ourselves at first, cannot arrive in any way (and even this may be understood essentially) at an apriori doctrine of consciousness, unless simply coming from the fact; that furthermore we can never arrive at some transcendental consideration of the world in another way than coming from a world of natural experience, a psychophysical (of course also humanistic) givenness of consciousness,[[7]](#footnote-7) so that always the way towards transcendental phenomenology **may** be taken via apriori psychology, and then in a similar epoché to be performed at the apriori, as we perform it from natural [9] consciousness. Certainly, if you once **have** gained transcendental consciousness in the fact, then you do not need to take apriori psychology as a means any more.

What now is characteristic of the absolute epoché of transcendental philosophy, or rather, of positing the transcendental pure subjectivity as an absolute positing? As a phenomenological Ego I simply do not have anything else but me, this means, I have me only through the original positing and uncovering of that, which is absolutely given therein.[[8]](#footnote-8) The problem here is: How does the phenomenological Ego cope with the “lower” reflected natural Ego? I do indeed experience the world, and I only therefore see and hear things, etc., and I consider scientific connections, and otherwise they could not be “phenomena” for me, which I could consider transcendentally. Well, the epoché simply does not mean an unconceivable destruction of experiences, objectivations, cogitative acts, etc.; in a certain way everything remains the same. But all acts have changed their mode of performing from the Ego.

<§ 3.> Interested and disinterested spectator.

Natural reflection – transcendental reflection

The split[[9]](#footnote-9) Ego, in the way it is a phenomenological one, is not an interested spectator as the commonly reflecting one, and in the identity one and the same Ego having the world, and at the same time watching the world experience, the consciousness having and cognizing the world; but by its being a “disinterested” spectator, it so to say also hurts the lower natural Ego – apart from the change the reflection as such introduces. When I perform natural reflection, of course I do not see the same world life, the same perceptions, etc., as before. The reflective acts are not mere additions, they are not something like covers, enclosing the simple acts the way they were before [10]. But the modification is such a one, which contains its sense of positing, modalizes it in a way that the accepted, the content of the positing (objective sense) remains what it was. We can go over from one to the other attitude, and we do this usually in a reflective way. The sense of acceptance remains identical in such alternating transitions. This means that that, which is accepted by me, the Ego, keeps on being accepted. As the Ego performing the acceptance I am the same Ego, I have not changed thereby.

As Ego of the epoché I do have changed essentially though. I deny all belief in the world, every act as a worldling the performance of acceptance, and even the natural evidence of any kind [I deny] this. I am not a natural Ego thereby any more. Not only do I have a reflective attitude; As an Ego I am not the same any more, I have in a universal way changed my interest (= attitude, theme); I have changed my whole former actions, I can only – without modification – perform transcendental actions. Perfect clarity is needed here!

I indeed live on, I look around, I want to regard the thing more closely, I perform positive science, theorize mathematically, etc.; all this therefore I do as I used to do, I do perform all actions. Yes, certainly. But I am still not there “with all my heart”,[[10]](#footnote-10) I do not perform it the way I naturally used to perform it, no positing of being and thereby no practical positing of the world is as it used to be. The things, objects of experience as such were experienced and posited before that, the judgments judged as such, experienced as such; Judging, evaluating, deciding, choosing means, striving at purposes, therein something experienced, something existent as such, facts, values, purposes as such <have been> an absolute theme. Means and purposes <have been> means and purposes as such, the themes have been themes as such, each a relative or absolute theme. Contrary to that I do have my actual thematic field exclusively within consciousness now, and every natural theme has experienced some modification of the essence, it is a theme within consciousness, which I alone regard as a theme, it is an “intentional object” as such, but not an object as such for me.

[11] But is everything finally clarified here? Let us reconsider. In how far is this an epoché, what do I deny? Supposed I maintain my natural devotedness to the world, the natural belief in the world, my natural world life. I perform a splitting of the Ego, in which I become the “disinterested spectator”, I describe the intentional life of the natural Ego, that, which it posits as being accepted, and *quasi* accepted, that, which it wishes and *quasi* wishes, etc., but simply in a disinterested way and without “performing as well” any of these acts itself, positing any positings as well.

Description of the actualities and possibilities, description of the experienced world of the lower Ego, the supposed one, in such a way as it is meant by it, and that, which it has and would describe as identical world in the progress of its experience in constant corroboration, in univocal progress, the way it would get to know the world it has in mind (with certain undetermined horizons), how the identification would proceed under the title of this getting to know, would always say “the same”, but the same showing its sides, features, which have not been experienced heretofore, but are now becoming experienced. Likewise in theoretical cognition. All acceptances of the natural Ego as acceptances it has given acceptance to, all its unities with their sense as unities of their manifoldness, as which have received their sense and their acceptance from this Ego or the Ego connection.

Then we have the following shape of natural life (at first only if I am a beginner in phenomenology):[[11]](#footnote-11) I live a natural life, and I establish a “transcendental” life of cognition, in places spanning the same, on the basis of some motivation however to be described. In places I lay my transcendental “profession” down, and I keep on living my natural life; but habitually I remain a transcendentalist, I continue the formerly interrupted descriptions, I return to the transcendental attitude, as afterwards to the natural attitude. I live a split [12] life, a life as a natural worldling, and a life, in which pure life, the actual and possible one, is my theme, in which I as a cognizing subject, as a “transcendental” one, do not perform any natural positing along. Scientifically: As a natural Ego I perform positive science, as a transcendental one [Ego] only transcendental [science]. Both kinds of science do not belong in one layer as all sciences in the layer of positive life.

Transcendental life then becomes itself again a theme of transcendental reflection – or may become, and *in infinitum*. But all these reflections are always transcendental again. I take subjectivity as a theme, the way it lives and has as themes within its life objectivities of any kind, universes, worlds. If it has itself as a theme as living somehow, then it may again make this having-something-thematic a theme in further reflection, and cognize itself as the same, which heretofore had something else as a theme, or already [had] itself as a theme as living in a certain way. But here simply something purely subjective is already and ever again a theme, and subjectivity in all reflections becomes the theme in infinity. In contrast to that, a cut is: not having thematizing subjectivity as a theme, but having the world as a theme, and therein “real” subjectivity as a theoretical theme, whereby something naturally real inevitably is an accompanying theme.

Subjectivity may be made a theme – in universal context being subjective through and through – in such a way that thereby absolutely nothing is in the theme and itself a theme, which is not subjectivity, [[12]](#footnote-12) and I also pursue subjectivity, which has itself as a theme, in reflecting ever new steps, and I make it purely thematic, so that I may see, how subjectivity has themes on all steps, and what it may give acceptance to, and may prove as being in truth in the way of “reason”.

How is the world “constituted” – the subjectivity constituting it enters the theme and becomes an exclusive theme in reflection -, how is this subjectivity constituted and becomes [13] a unity itself, a theme, something accepted? – Now the subjectivity constituting it becomes a theme, etc.

But we need to differ here. The subjectivity constituting the world becomes thematic, but it already constituted when being pre-thematic. How does something subjective being pre-thematic become thematic and cognizable? The thematizing itself is something pre-thematic and may become thematic in second reflection, etc.

Do I not need to say: The epoché is not an abstention from acceptance in the common sense alone, but an abstention from making-thematic and having-as-a-thematic-horizon? “Depriving of acceptance”, “parenthesizing”, this does not mean that I leave it undecided, I pretend to not believe (I think my way into non-belief, as if I had never been motivated to ever perform any positing of being as such, or would never get into the position to further do it), I question, and the like.

To live naturally, have a natural attitude means to have the universe accepted not only in the sense that a universe and the universe is always actual to me, but that it is the universal poly-system of all of my activities, i.e., it is the universal theme, or rather, the universe of all themes, actual and possible ones, as long as I live naturally. All of my thematic attitudes are attitudes towards the accepted world, or nothing worldly “is accepted” by me and has been accepted by me and will be accepted by me, nothing but something worldly is accepted by me in cognizing (i.e. nothing but that is my theme of cognition), nothing but that is accepted by me in the evaluating and realizing, or rather, realizing willing (nothing is than something worldly, my theme of evaluation, my theme of desiring, theme of striving, my theme of will), is accepted by me in actual and possible actuality. The natural attitude has a “universal” “thematic field”, self-contained in all infinity. It is a consequent habit of performance.[[13]](#footnote-13)

[14] From positional acts, in which anything is a current theme, a habit of consequently thematic positionality has grown, a universal thematic field, I and we all are constantly “focused” on.[[14]](#footnote-14) I may change this thematic attitude, that is, I may completely put out of action the universal thematic field. I change my attitude in such a way that I, at first originally instituting now and then habitually, make thematic pure subjectivity, at least in ever again interrupting and interrupted places of a professional life, i.e. merely the subjective thing as it was a theme and any time may be, by switching off that universal theme, and then [make thematic] possible subjectivity as such and in purity. I already said this in the *Ideas*: I do not change my convictions; but de facto I do not want to make any “use” of them, put them into effect, utilize them in a thematic way. They do not belong in my theme, and shall remain excluded radically.

I may make a judgment as such and keep in acceptance afterwards from the making. My “theme” therein <is> the object of judgment, the object-on-what and also the fact; this is the natural judgment-performance: to simply judge and to lastingly have the judgment as my judgment, even if not currently judged. I may also though perform the judgment, and while I do not disclose that, which it posits, do not change my conviction, nor “abstain”, [may] make a theme the judging itself, and in such a way as it contains a theme, and thereby in such a way that I do not have as a “theme” the theme of judging itself, therefore take the epoché out of the theme. Certainly also in the way of common reflection, in which I have thematic the judging and its judgment at the same time. And thus for the whole life. What is more: I may have apperceived the judging in a worldly psychological way, and <I> then have *implicite* my body and the other world within the theme; but I may also discount this apperception or take out of the theme everything [15] it implies, etc. Put out of the action: The action is the thematic action and nothing else.[[15]](#footnote-15)

<§ 4. The “transcendental idealism” as synthesis of natural and transcendental attitude>

I have described the thematic attitude of the transcendental Ego as an attitude of cognition. It is of course a practical attitude insofar, as it strives for “parenthesis”, towards consideration in intuiting, towards development and description. Here thus we have a self-determination of the transcendental Ego at hand, a treating-oneself in the direction of transcendental cognition. I view my new transcendental field, have a transcendental horizon in the *Ego cogito*, and I work into it in a cognizing way, whereby I co-create this horizon and this field at the same time. [[16]](#footnote-16)

What else though may be transcendentally wished for? If I perform a will being naturally directed, that of the worldling, then I practically have something non-transcendental as a theme[[17]](#footnote-17). Every will I perform in transcendental interpretation of the world obviously is a transcendental will, its doing, its goal, its deed something transcendental. But how, if I bring into play the **natural will** for the purpose of considering **it** transcendentally? And thus as such, if I now live a piece of natural life, in order to describe it transcendentally? Do we not need to draw the distinction: Theme as a telos and theme as a means? Of course. “Means and purpose” is a known difference, and cognition as well often is a means. I can thus now perform a universal epoché, i.e., set the whole naturally thematic horizon out of the theme, and then still live a piece of natural life, and only as a means of [16] transcendental examination: Then I have something non-transcendental as a means within my transcendental interest, which alone is a final interest, and insofar it is transcendental itself, transcendentally functioning.[[18]](#footnote-18)

On the other hand I may have a transcendental attitude (and this means, to have pure subjectivity as a final theme and in consequence), and also in the way of furthermore natural life (interrupting my transcendental work), that I do not have a transcendental attitude during the latter, but a naïve one; but in such a way that I make again a theme all naturally lived life by parenthesizing its theme in the way of a professional one, returning to transcendental work, and thus *in infinitum*. If I am a transcendental philosopher by profession, then *eo ipso* all my natural life professionally belongs to my theme, according to its transcendental purity and the performance made therein: Outside of the professional work, I do not need to think about it, may live along quite “naively”; It would still be concerned covertly of my habituality as a transcendentalist if it comes down to reflect on every piece of life transcendentally.

But the question is, whether here a life in “double accounting” was not actually possible. In a certain way of course, insofar as two fundamental attitudes alternate in both prevailing life forms, and every theme goes on being accepted through the interruptions, but certainly only for so long as I have not noticed that transcendental phenomenology interferes with the sense of a natural consideration of the world. In that moment, in which I have arrived at the transcendental interpretation of the natural way of living and its world as such, at transcendental idealism, every further natural life, even if in the background, has its transcendental apperception, even if not currently performed from the Ego in current epoché and reflection.[[19]](#footnote-19) A synthesis of the natural and transcendental consideration of the world must be performed necessarily, [17] and this performance simply is “transcendental idealism”.

Natural life may be in its naivety now unreasonable, now reasonable, and as a whole without unity of a rational organization. But in advance we considered the transcendental as a unity of a life, directed towards truth and transcendental cognition of reason (and towards transcendental practice of reason as such). But how, if natural life may be justified, or rather, if its Ego wants it, and wants it in universal reflection? Here the Ego performs a universal critical epoché.

<§ 5.> The critical epoché in natural life, in its different widths. Forms of “universal” epoché[[20]](#footnote-20)

1. The universe is there for me as one with a natural attitude. I perform a critical overview over my individual life of cognition, I question all my opinions: overthrow. But I do not think of questioning the world itself. Thus it is not a universal epoché in truth. Here it is important to note: If my interest is directed towards a universal world cognition in the form of a genuine science apodictically justifying itself (in an apodictically to be justified method), then the existence of the world is not questioned by me, I presuppose it as given through universal experience. Certainly this givenness is such a one that the “judgments of perception” do not have a final acceptance, and that on top of that always only parts and sides are given of the world. We need a methodical approach to work out strict objectivity as a scientific one. I want to enable this radically, and in that way I want to begin at the outset: therefore universal overthrow! I have no reason to question my predisposition of world existence here: I only ask how do I arrive at science from experience. But certainly I soon see that I need a critique of experience, that every experience is presumptive. I do not fail to see now that a belief of experience lies in every experience, which may be corroborated [18] but also annulled, and I do not fail to see that the world as such is only there for me from experience. But I presuppose its existence.
2. I now try to go into extreme. I may then for example not forget that also foreign men and <the> possibility of a world, shaped in which way ever, are preconditions. I now perform an actual universal epoché with regard to the universe, the actual and a possible one, and all fore-meanings as such. All world practice presupposes the correctness of the experience belief and world belief. It is thus questioned as well, although, if the world existence was critically secured, still other questions of justification existed for it, those on the value and disvalue of the practical goals, on the highest values and purposes. I still have cognition, not pregiven opinions, but freely posited ones with the critical elimination of the world existence, which is now questionable: asking subjectivity and that, which it considers questionable, and the multitude of opinions as opinions. It is indeed possible as well to ask questions about legitimacy here. But anyway, I have, before I do that, an area here, which is not questioned by the world being questioned, rather is presupposed as a realm of possible questions.
3. How about the universal critical questioning on the universal transcendental epoché now? The world and all position taking on the world is deprived of thematic acceptance within it, if it, as we thought, remains independent of all critique. The goal was the world in the universal critical epoché, namely how the experience was to be justified by it, how the method of objectively accepted theoretic cognition was to be established by apodictic and final justification, and which, if all that is made possible, was accepted for it in a completely grounded way. But as long as its existence, the right and the consequence of its experience, is questioned, I cannot utter any sentence on it, it cannot be any pregiven field of themes for so long, and I cannot posit itself according to actuality and possibility. Only the question remains: Is and how is the opinion’s truth that the world was and anything ascribed to it, to be justified?

[19] I do not have any real ground as in the transcendental attitude, I have something merely subjective, mere opinion as something subjective, only that I have the goal within the critical attitude to gain the right for the way that I, if at all, could win the world as a thematic sphere. I only have the interest within transcendental attitude from the beginning to cognize the universe of pure subjectivity, I make it a theme, at first in an uncritical way. It undeniably lies at hand for positing.

But does not reason then belong in this realm, that is, the right of certain opinions? As the right of all opinions as such, according to all their kinds and forms? Certainly. Subjectivity as such has opinions, identifies them and keeps them in further acceptance or discloses them, it verifies them and infirms them, gains the “evidence” of a prolonged intersubjective truth, which everybody needs to accept with insight, etc. The transcendentalist is interested in this as a type of possible subjective happenings among others. The theorist of cognition is purely interested in the norms of verification and in rules, how one may verify, or in how a given opinion of this or that category may be decided as true or false. Then the epistemologist was merely a logical “noetic scientist”.[[21]](#footnote-21)

If the epistemologist is actually limited in such a way that he is only directed towards world cognition, gain of world truth, then he misses the transcendentally constitutive of the cognitional formation, and of the world itself as a unity of cognition, and of course also the questions on the legitimacy of transcendental cognition itself, and also the questions on the right of cognizing legal norms for a possible objective cognition.[[22]](#footnote-22) But in that moment, in which he questions the world, and even questions [a] possible world, as to how it was to be established as a possibility, does he not need to find himself standing on purely subjective ground and raise the transcendental questions on the possibility of cognition? Is [20] thus epistemology a merely dependent part of the transcendental science? All questions have a ground for the questions, that of a being one. The common cognitive questions [have] that of the world, the universal question on the legitimizing ground of pure world cognition as such [has] the being of subjectivity as a pure one.

As soon as I ask the question on the possibility of cognizing something really being and thereby do not have any world existence as ground, I simply loose the world as a theme and as a thematic field, I only have “the world” then as an alleged one in actuality and possibility, and this is something subjective. I thus only stand, may only stand within the universal thematic field of transcendental pure subjectivity. It is my thematic field, meaning, I posit it as being, possible, etc., also as questionable, simply in the way of thesis; but it is thereby already pre-posited as being in universality and determinability.

As soon as I the other way round universally posit transcendental subjectivity, as a thematic field, I therein have the whole problem of universal epistemology, like of any theory of reason. Every possible natural theme then is in my field as one performed in the natural life of a subject or a community. My theme is pure subjectivity, the single or communalized one, with all its thematic acts and everything being the theme. This is just not my theme, I do not posit along, I, as the transcendentalist. It may be thereby that I keep as my private opinion that of the world existence, that is, perform natural theses within the world apart from the transcendental one in private life, like I, as an epistemologist may have and do have my private life. But I do not perform any natural thesis as such in transcendental professional life, but only as a means for transcendental consideration (likewise as an epistemologist). I then still have a transcendental attitude, I perform a piece of life, I generate it as one, thematizing in this and that way, without meaning as such that (I, the transcendental Ego), which is meant there.

If I now ever again perform actually or in fantasy, as a possibility, natural life, but in such a way that I posit as “absolute” my transcendental life, simply as being thematically [21] accepted by me, then I may for example follow the way of natural life, namely, how it further sustains itself in further acceptance and identification by positing a theme, and how a natural Ego now has positivities, something identical, one and the same, which it posited in many acts, and has accepted as the same and possibly has “evident”, and how it verifies its thematic positings, its opinions in evidence, and how then the essential law is accepted that the idea of a univocal system of possible experience lies within all cognition of something real or the idea of an identical theme, which would be verified in all experience, even in disclosed experience, etc., and in general, that the idea of a verifiable being, of a truth valid “in itself”, is contained in every thematic positing, etc.

The natural Ego believes to be something, and it strives to verify this something in the drive for cognition, and to apprehend it itself in such a complete way, and to view it as what it is itself, that it ever again beholds as the same, and [that] every opinion related to that ever again may become evident on the basis of self-beholding. The natural life shows this in natural attitude, and the transcendental consideration shows this as an inclination of natural life towards being and truth. If now transcendental consideration considers the meaning and verifying life and constructs the idea of the possibility of complete verification for every kind of being from its essence, then it necessarily finds the true being and the truth as an identical one belonging to the possible synthesis and possibly to the idea of an endless synthesis, and thereby the true being as an occurrence of subjectivity and all positive truth as an idea belonging to subjectivity.

Is thus the natural world as well “suspended” as pure and simple world, then this only means that I, as a transcendental philosopher, deny to purely and simply posit it in the naivety of natural life, posit it as an absolute theme.[[23]](#footnote-23) But if I posit [22] subjectivity as an absolute theme[[24]](#footnote-24), and at first the possible one, then I also find the possibility for a subjectivity, living such a life within itself, in which a true world is contained as a theme, fore-meant, contained within the opinions and completely to be verified, and as a theme of positive sciences, which may proceed any time into the direction of the idea of the true world. I thereby have inseparably, since intentionally included, within the possibility of the respective subjectivity that of a world, being for it and verifying itself within it, and this world is an idea belonging to the endless idea of this subjectivity, [the idea] of a system of verifications contained in it, to be performed in free doing, and of an idea, coming to light therein, of an identical theme, ever again proving itself as a true one. This implies, every possible world is an intentional occurrence, even if the idea of a synthesis of endlessly many intentional occurrences within a subjectivity correlatively belonging to it, for which it designates a law of its concrete life.

That, which is accepted of the possibility, is then also accepted of the fact. I am and experience a world and have the expectancy that the experience will ever again proceed towards accordance, and that afterwards I will always have a thematic field of rational positive theory, the way I had it up till now. That, which I have performed in a naturally naïve way, and have ever again believed in, and never made clear to me in naïve evidence (matter of course), this I understand from the phenomenological theory of transcendental subjectivity, and understand that the idealism <is> not a metaphysic hypothesizing, not a hypothesis, accepting realisms alongside as counter hypotheses to be considered, but as the necessary interpretation, progressing in eidetic insights, of an Ego investigating sense in its own doing and its own sense-bestowing, and of its world, the only possible and absolute truth. Absolutely there is only transcendental being and a transcendentally constituted world as idea.

The transcendental attitude is arbitrary, insofar as one may live naively indeed, as long as one wishes to. But as soon as it is performed once [23], considered and theoretically explained, it shows itself as the only justified one, encompassing all conceivable and cognizable, and it is shown that it alone enables completely concrete cognition, in which alone the onesidedness of the natural world view is overcome. This would be remain as true as it was, properly it was not wrong; it <was> a “naïve” apprehension[[25]](#footnote-25), which does never know that the world is no absolute thing, but only something simply and purely posited and verified and verifiable (essentially) in transcendental subjectivity, and as that subjective through and through.

The expression “blinkered apprehension” is critical. We need indeed quite difficult procedures to gain the absolute ground, and to understand it as an absolute one. It is already difficult to adhere to the naïve pure turning towards the inside, and as far as it succeeds, it is still threatened by misunderstanding.

Also “subjectivity”, the mere “Ego”, and being for “us” of the world is quite easily misunderstood. No idea, no ideal object of which kind ever is really immanent to life as consciousness temporarily streaming in an immanent way.[[26]](#footnote-26) Continuously its intentional What belongs to each consciousness at its time point and in its fulfilled time stretch. The identity of this What at different points of the continuous time stretch, and then again the identity of the same of discretely separated acts (through acts directed in another direction), of something today and yesterday, reproduced by memory, is not the identity of pieces of mental livings. Every mental living is simply consciousness, and is consciousness in every phase, it “means” something, it is consciousness of something, and the peculiar essence of the consciousness establishes a synthesis, especially synthesis within the coincidence “of the same”. Insofar as I, considering consciousness in every synthesis, to which it belongs, or into which <I> may bring it freely, find that it coincides with regard to the same, I say, and with evidence simply in the case of the coincidence’s “evidence” “it means the same everywhere”, it is “directed” towards the same, conscious of the same. [24] Insofar as I describe that, which belongs to this same, I perform acts, which are related to the respective consciousness in a kind of “synthesis of description”. The same is intentional within the descriptions, which is intentional within the described mental living.

Ideal being in the common sense de facto has no other kind of objectivity, of the being in itself, as a real being, and real being is itself a kind of ideality, i.e., dependent insofar as it is only conceivable as a synthetic pole of coincidence, unity pole, pole for subjectivity directed to it or possibly directed.

But what a different thing now is subjectivity itself than again “something being”, something being for subjectivity, and so on? Is not “idealism” deleted by that? The answer must be: That, which “idealism” exhibits, is that some being thing is only conceivable as objective, real “within” transcendentally-subjective life, namely with relation to Ego poles and a regulated structure of their lives. Furthermore, that something being as such is only conceivable as being related to transcendental subjectivity, and that transcendental subjectivity thereby is related back to itself. Its being is a constituting-itself. As wondrous as it is, it is still understandable, although the deepest problems in comprehension lie here. All objective being is relative towards a certain pure subjectivity implying it in its essential structure and [in] its fact as an idea; this subjectivity itself is again relative, but it is self-relative, and if no countersenseful endless regresses shall lie here, then the essential structure of pure subjectivity needs to show simply this in its clarification, that and how it is constituted within and for itself, without “actual infinities” belonging to it.

<§ 6.> Ontology and phenomenology

Indeed there is a universal ontology encompassing all possible being, after transcendental idealism has been scientifically put into action, but universal ontology of tradition is a positive science and itself ontology of [25] positivity, it is an apriori science of something being in the sense of the real in formal generality and further science of the *a priori* predelineated regional structures within universal reality as such.

It has this building, this structural order of disciplines, ideally spoken. And ideally spoken this scientific whole is related back to the idea of some allness of coexisting realities, belonging to every *idealiter* possible reality. We meet at least the problem: wherein a multitude <of> realities is a self-contained allness, co-demanding every corresponding reality from every one, and not a multitude, still being apart from this allness, and at the same time the problem, whether every reality needs to belong to such an allness: a “universe”, a world being a universe. Is the idea of a universe within positive ontology not a mere demand in contingency? (Axiom of completeness: the way that indeed every universe was to be enlarged “de facto”, but presupposes as a possibility that simply a multitude of realities is concluded so that not all possible realities are unified, but simply all de facto ones.) It would be a problem of contingency: Is it contingent, that is, for every possible totality of realities, that it actually contains exactly these and not other possible realities as well?

But on top of this another problem of contingency: Is the complete apriori of ontology not only formal in a certain sense, namely in such a way that *a priori* not a single world possibility could be constructed in a concrete way? Is it not though to be discerned *a priori* on the other hand that every reality, or rather, every implicit context of reality can only exist as a consistently determined one? But can a world be a “substance”, completely determinable from itself, that is, a substrate of a rational science it determines completely?

But do we not need to say: If every concrete possible world has its complete rational science, then also possible worlds needed to correspond to the *a priori* constructible rational sciences of unambiguous determination, and every possibility needed to be actually constructible? What speaks against it? The problem of the determination of the psychic. Perhaps it may be [26] appreciated that subjectivity in the world, as human or animal subjectivity, indeed has a really rational form, but is not rationalizable in a positive scientific way in the sense of unambiguous determination. Is not every possible world contingent, and thus the de facto world, and does it not demand a principle in spite of that, which makes it necessary?

If in contrast to that it is shown by transcendental philosophy that the world is only conceivable as an idea in the context of transcendental subjectivity, then we possess the ontology of transcendental subjectivity as such in transcendental phenomenology. Within this ontology, which thus only is directed towards possible subjectivity, an individual and common one, only the general form, born into each monad as the epitome of its essential laws and that of its compossibility with other ones, is apprehended. To this also the understandable law belongs that the material essence of every monad is rationally undetermined, and only imaginable from itself, and to be uncovered in an originally intuitive way.[[27]](#footnote-27) Every monad can only “reflect” itself by way of expression, and thereby through objectivation in other monads. This does not mean that the whole content of the monad needs to express itself directly in all moments. If the monad is separated in its essence into externality and internality, in such a way that something else is combined to that, which makes itself known directly, which may be supplemented in an “analogically” apperceptive way from everywhere the same inner motivation, then communication beyond the externally expressive is already possible.

Expression within bodiliness and its steps. Expression through external signs awoken in a bodily way, through language and script. The expressive sphere and the intimate. Everything as in natural worldview, only interpreted in a transcendental way.

[27]

<§ 7.> Metaphysics

Pre-established harmony of the monads. External community of awake monads, inner community of “not uncovered” monads. A law of development needs to go through all of them, by which awake monads and a world constituted within them are the result in the total uncovering. The foreign makes itself known in the drive for development, the transcendental thing within the instincts. A universal law of the drive towards other ones. Communication through expression, a means for sociality. The monads strive for community, from the covered community into the open one and into that of socially-personal acting. Universal laws of love. Social life, life in love and hate. But the negativity of hate. Every No strives for a Yes. Single bliss and common bliss. Development of the world against the “goal” of a blissful community, a community, in which loving justice reigns, a conscious one. Development is not a mere passivity. It contains the direction towards the becoming of free activity. The Ego of the awakened monads: the free Ego. The freely responsible decision of reason.[[28]](#footnote-28)

The Ego poles of God’s place. God lives within the children of God. Every true act of reason an act of God. God as an idea. Immortality of the Ego, the monads. The true Ego, the “true” monadic being and life, which has come to its truth, its telos.

The most perfect world and humanity as an idea. Transcendental: the most perfect transcendental community as an acting idea. The necessity, with which this idea is not only accepted, but also determines the development of the absolute being. Metaphysics.

It is an absolute life, and it is a life of the finiteness in the single one and within time. And the “eternal” one works in it as the only finally working one and working in every working, the divinity, towards whom all egological born into it lives. Every single Ego a beam of the divinity, but also every community in “distance” from the divinity. Degrees of distance from God [28] and obscuration (before the wakefulness, then sin, unreason). Way of salvation: Free self-discovering and self-justification and deed of reason, the way of salvation. Single chains. Humanity chains. But the whole world needs to wake up and become a community of reason.

1. Parallelism of the purely psychological and transcendental truths. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Compare P. Natorp, *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* (General psychology following the critical method), first volume: *Objekt und Methode der Psychologie* (Object and method of psychology), Tübingen 1912 (in Husserl’s library), e.g. second chapter, pages 22-39, esp. P. 39.- Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This is my consciousness of the body as organ of perception fort he perceived object. „Organ of perception“ though is not only the name of the mere physical thing, neither the physically understood organism. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Not quite clearly worked out. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Pfänder? Phenomenological psychology. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Apriori cosmology. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. And this holds true even essentially. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This sentence is slightly deleted with a pencil. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. „split“ deleted with a pencil. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. „with all my heart“ slightly deleted with a pencil. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Beginner in ph<enomenology>: But this is accepted for the change between purely psychological reflection on one’s own consciousness life and more naive [reflection] in life as such. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. But may we not say exactly the same of the psychological pure subjectivty within pure psychology? [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. „It is a consequent habit of performance.“ Ddeleted with the pencil. On the whole paragraph written in the margin: „But this is a matter of course! Since for me in the state of naturalness all immediate givenness is a natural givenness of experience, and since all experience results in the unity of a universal experience, in continuous unity. But then this matter of course needs to be made „understandable“! The first universe of all themes of course is the universe of straight experience!“ – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. „focused on“ slightly deleted with the pensil. On the margin: „The world as a universe is generally not a theme in the „natural attitude“, therefore it is properly speaking not an attitude. The world is pregiven, is the field of all natural attitudes in the proper thematic sense.“ – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. If I want universally pure psychology, then I first need to make a „theme“ the total universe world (posit in a unitary way) and abstractively [make] the psychic universe therein a theme in the second sense of the theme being exclusively abstractive for me, the special theme. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Compare the appendices on 9’, αβγ <= appendix I, page 28, German edition>; the other appendices on the „theme“ I-IV belonging here <= appendix II, page 33, German edition> are attached. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The practon is a natural practon of the „natural will“. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. But in the performance of this function epoché still is performed; the belief is not unmodified. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. „epoché and recflection“ deleted. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. On this „γ“ (= appendix I, pages 31, 18-32, 40) [German edition]. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Noetic logic (theory of cognition in the practical sense). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. He will study the cognition of reason in pure psychology on a natural ground, and thus will find all constitutive. But the justification were a circle, if he presupposed the world, and criticized the world experience on the basis of psychology. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. - thus in advance, thanks to the naively performed experience remaining accepted, to have the world, and to make it a theme of sciences, whether according to fields, whether universally: how it is qualitied. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. - for what I need a special activity though, in artificial attitude, a transcendental reduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. „it <was> a „naive“ apprehension“ in exchange for „it was only a blinkered apprehension“- Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Ideal objects and real ones. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Each is rationally undetermined for itself, rationally only determined according to its form, a form of its potentialities. Each is uncovered de facto only according to its de facto experience as realization of one of the rational possibilities, and that, which the monad currently already is, is only accessible for other ones by way of expression. Actualized content of the monad and horizon of potentiality. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Birth and death, fate, contingency. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)